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History is not merely a record of the human past; it is as much about the present and who 
and what we are and hold valuable, as it is about our trepidations and anxieties and hopes, as 
much to do with the looming of  the future as the burdens and triumphs of the past. History 
enfolds times past, present and yet to come. History is warning as well as record. From our 
present understanding of the past we attempt to eliminate possibilities taken which have thrown 
us into the hells that we must leave or perish within. But History is also the record of 
achievement, conquest of obstacles, founding, exodus and deliverance from some parts of 
humanity’s own existence, from enemies who have emerged in space or across time (including 
the enemy of unbearable traditional practices and unsustainable oppressive social stratifications). 
Friends and enemy might be essential to the horizon of the political, but it is through History 
peoples are also instructed in the inimical nature of their own traditions.   
History is also a record of events that have left such an indelible impression upon our 
species that they still matter— to switch metaphor, they still radiate and we still live within their 
radiance. Our historical impressions are intrinsic to us. Though it is not always obvious where 
history and History match up - while we have a plethora of evidence to confirm that the past 
incubates within the present, this does not mean that we are Historically aware. We must re-
member and re-collect the multiplicity of dismemberments that constitute the temporality of 
human action, the actions that still matter, even if merely to entertain our curiosity.  
That re-membering is evident in our  institutions, in the names which are passed down to 
us, in habits and our moral choices – and moral philosophers to the contrary, reason has taught us 
far less about moral behavior that knowledge of the terrible things our forefathers have done: 
history is the autobiography of the human species.  
 This is also to say that history is meaningful –it speaks to our foreboding, it forewarns (if 
not of the unexpected, of the dreadfully familiar), it orientates, and the questions we pose to it 
emerge from the criss-crossings of forces, fears, hopes and possibilities which we as questioners 
are caught up in.  We are the species who make meaning of everything we do. This is the result 
of having language, or better expressed, the result of us having a special and—as far as we 
know—a unique relationship to the universe. We realize that the universe, or at least that part of 
it with which we are engaged, expands not only through material relationships but through 
language – the commands and impositions, urgings and imploring which constantly change out 
material circumstances. Human language is not mere ‘signing’ of the sort that we can discern in 
other species, and that we may engage in with other species; it is different in kind. And the key 
to that difference is in the grammar and the scope of our intentions, retentions and projections. 
We might be able to explain the origin of the universe through physics, but we cannot explain the 
signing and breaking of treaties, declarations of war and peace, the foundations of peoples and 
constitutions, marriage ceremonies or marriage proposals, or the names that signify any of the 
great historical events, unless we resort to the peculiar fact that human beings are speaking 
creatures (cf. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, 1981). Only human beings have a history because only 
human beings have institutions, and only human beings have institutions because only human 
beings have speech; speech is the redistribution of possibilities within and accrued over time so 
that past and future become as meaningful as the present in our self and world making. Thus, too, 
only human beings participate in the universe the way they do because they are able to connect 
their intrinsic capacity to make themselves meaningful by seeing the universe of which they are a 
part as meaningful. For if we speak, then that must be a potentiality within the universe itself.  
 This condition is the real reason why the earliest human beings saw the universe as alive, 
as something that we commune with. (Frankforts, Wilson, and Jacobsen, 1946). Today we are 
more abstract—and more forgetful: we think ‘nature’ is a meaningful term, as if that should be 
obvious to everybody, when it is so far from obvious that it was not until the Greeks had city 
states that the term physis which enabled the dissolution of the entirety of living forms of life 
into the one archē that philosophers had disputed  would be found in water (Thales), air 
(Anaximenes), the infinite (Anaximander), the four elements (Empedocles), atoms (Leucippus 
and Democritus), the word and fire (Heraclitus), Being itself (Parmenides) was chanced upon. 
Though even then the question of whether matter (hylē) or intelligence (nous) were the necessary 
conditions to make further sense of the nature of nature – that is some essence behind/ within 
physis - would continue.  
If, though, living things emerge and are swallowed by time, as Cronus swallows his children, 
institutions and peoples too emerge, found, achieve and die. We are born into a reality where we 
are ever in this process, and thus find ourselves immersed in the birth, life and death of 
institutions and forces bigger than ourselves, which shape ourselves, which is to say  history – 
just as we are always making history and institutions (which is our fate) so that we can survive 
and, where possible, prosper.  Mechanistic metaphysics aside, experientially we encounter one 
vital power after another. Everything we know about human beings suggests that our earliest 
ancestors did not isolate themselves from the world around them—as if mind and nature were 
separate ‘substances.’ Descartes knew that his dualism was a decisive break with how experience 
had always previously been grasped — ‘subjects’ were born when humans saw themselves as 
standing over life (even if, as in Kant, that standing over is a purely moral posture)  rather than as 
other creatures participating, even if having a special place within life itself.  
Ancient humans responded to the fact that the powers of life are not ever always visible, that all 
too often they emerge and overtake us. The earliest names for these powers that emerge and 
withdraw were the names of gods and spirits. They were powers so strong that they inspired awe 
in human beings, and humans would call upon and commune with them, for people knew their 
very survival depended upon the meaning of the spirits and forces that they encountered within 
the world. Concomitantly, ancient humanity did not separate something off from the rest of its 
life called ‘religion’; religion was as intrinsic to humanity’s self-expression, orientation and 
understanding  as it was to the meaning of being in the world. We know this from the fact that 
almost wherever we have evidence of ancient humanity we have remnants of rituals suggesting 
the continuum between life and death—graves, altars, and monuments. And the earliest written 
records all point to human beings having been created by, and calling upon and having their lives 
compared with and frequently controlled by spirits and the gods (cf. Christopher Dawson, 1928). 
Religion was, as far as we can tell, along with the social rules of the tribe, the most primordial 
means of human orientation in the universe.  Now many moderns look to science and art and the 
economy and suchlike to provide us with meaning, but religion still persists for many people 
because there is some aspect of life—for some the sheer awe and mystery of it, for others a sense 
of what is divinely designated as right and wrong, for others the palpable power of  ritual and 
solidarity—that they feel is better grasped, in cooperation with fellow believers, and 
communicated, through ritual and a certain kind of speech other than what science, art, the 
economy, etc., can provide. A ‘scientific’ approach religion, or its elements - God, the afterlife 
etc. – will treat them as ‘objects’ (however diaphanous the ontologies required to do so become), 
as well as the believers who appeal to such ‘elements’ as objects. But human beings are above all 
doers and symbolic creatures, and religion is constituted through deeds and symbols, not 
objective qualities nor logical demonstrations, which is why art always comes closer to 
conveying the depth of feeling and meaning that is intrinsic to religion (even if it is not a 
substitute for religion, but only an adjunct) than science.   
 Like Hstory, religion is a cipher of who we are. Theology is the name we give to our 
analysis of the core terms and meanings of religion. It is not identical with religion, though it is 
often mistaken for being more like religion than it is; as is evident when we consider that while 
praying is a religious act, the explication of the meaning of a prayer is a theological one, and 
involves as little existential connection with the act of prayer as the scientist may have with the 
pain of an animal he or she is dissecting. Theology is a branch of philosophy. Indeed, it is one of 
its earliest branches. Plato may not have been the first theologian—Xenophanes’s fragments are 
theological, and even Hesiod’s transformation of Zeus into an all seeing ruler of moral rectitude 
suggests a theological mind at work —but as far as we know, Plato was the first to use the term 
‘theology’ (in the Republic 379 A), and it was in the context of his critique of the poets and a 
philosophical argument about the nature of the gods. Plato’s interest in the gods, as we recall 
from the second and third book of the Republic, was in the context of his ire at the poets for 
providing poor representations of the gods—for if the gods were truly as the poets had described 
them, they would be no better than the human beings they were supposed to rule and assist. 
Today, the number of philosophers who take theology as worthy of serious consideration is a 
minority (though theologians invariably go about their business in a philosophical manner—
albeit rarely reliant upon the dominant atomistic and naturalistic metaphysics of Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy). But if we are interested in the symbolic significance of history, and if we 
see history as a great store of symbolic significance, it is difficult to see how we can avoid 
theology, any more than we can avoid anthropology or sociology. For the overwhelmingly 
greater part of human history is redolent with references to the higher powers, the various gods, 
called upon by human beings in their social foundings and wars and trials and achievements. One 
can represent European history without a great deal of reference to religion, as for example 
Norman Davies does in his Europe: A History, but such a story has little to do with the names 
and signs—i.e. the building blocks—of the story that the Europeans who made that history used 
to express what they thought they were doing. In this respect, such overtly committed secularised 
Histories such as Davies’ Europe whilst demonstrating a certain commitment to the paradigmatic 
politics of their time, invariably come at a significant  anthropological sociological and historical 
cost. Though I concede that Davies’ minority/ethnic/ marginalized peoples driven narrative is 
palpably an investigation, though driven by a matrix of social, broadly political concerns which 
in important ways define some of the features of our time, brings to light new aspects of who and 
what we are. But the problem we confront today is not so much the gathering of what has been 
lost in the distance, but that what was most prominent in the journey of how and where we got to 
be here is so widely forgotten. And I use this ‘we’ and ‘here’ fully cognisant of the  varieties of 
social and cultural global differences the importance of which is not glossed over by merely 
deferring  to and valorizing ‘the different.’ But two world wars and the subsequent global 
communications revolutions that assist the acceleration of other global scientific, commercial, 
financial and administrative  techniques and technologies enforce a degree of homogeneity in 
which the different is  a responsive condition not a hermetically sealed one. Here now let me 
nuance the ‘we’’ and the ‘here’ and speak to the ‘we’ and ‘here’ of the developed Western world. 
All romantic tales of what great achievements occurred within pre-Modern China or in the 
Iberian Peninsula over a thousand years ago aside, the greater systems which implicate peoples 
today from the school and university and workplace to the nation state to the global economic 
and financial system and so forth emerged out of wars and revolutions that originally took place 
within what, the little known social thinker and historian  Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy termed, the 
‘Autobiography of Western ‘Man’ (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1969). If it was Marx who saw that 
revolutions are ‘the locomotives of history’ (Marx, 1973) and that the country that is ‘the country 
that is more developed industrially only shows, to -the less developed, the image of its own 
future,’ (Marx, 1887, 7) Rosenstock-Huessy, who engaged seriously and critically with Marx, 
devoted his life to laying out the history of the most elemental of larger scale social formations in 
the context of a universal history in which social break down, and war as well as revolution 
figure as ‘the locomotives’ which give humanity a shared history. That sharing is largely 
completed by the end of the First World War, and he would explore the great revolutions and 
wars (an early book of his would be called, if translated into English, The Marriage of Wars and 
Revolutions) which led Europeans to form the major  nations that would pull the world into the 
War which, if we take seriously the chaos still ensuing from the collapse of the Ottoman and 
Russian/ Soviet and British empires, it can be argued has still not completely ended (see 
Rosenstock-Huessy 1969, 1987, and 2008/9). The scale of the vision and the ambition of 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s enterprise is no less grand than Marx’s, though eschewing the reductive 
temptations of finding a singular source of revolutionary and historical causality  (something 
Engels tried, though hardly successfully to overcome in Marx) the enterprise is far more 
complicated. Rosenstock-Huessy threw out ideas at an astonishing rate, but the symmetry and 
significance of his work has, with a few notable exceptions such as Franz Rosenzweig  who 
deployed what Rosenstock-Huessy called the calendar method’ (i.e. pausing upon events of such 
historical significance they are woven into official calendars) for his The Star of Redemption, 
largely been lost. His student Harold Berman has produced the most detailed example of the 
application of Rosenstock-Huessy in his two volume work  which attempts to plot the 
innovations in the Western legal system from what Rosenstock-Huessy had called the Papal 
Revolution (or what is generally classified as the Investiture conflict in more traditional Histories 
of Political Thought) and the development and impact of canon law (Berman, 1983) through to 
the impact of Luther and Calvin upon the law and state in Germany and England (Berman, 
2006). Drawing upon (while not confining myself exclusively) to Rosenstock-Huessy the rest of 
this essay will pause upon the religious roots of global History. Of course the irony is not lost on 
me that at the very time the world was becoming ever more integrated that at any time in its 
history, historians were becoming more and more uncomfortable with the very idea of global or 
universal History. One might note that the same paradox was at work in all other manner of ways 
– e.g. radical political action was becoming ever more valorized at the very moment the world 
was becoming increasingly less responsive to radical political action; the social amnesia of the 
West increases exponentially with the increase in Historical  knowledge; ever more state 
managed and technocratic as the ‘triumph’ of neo-liberalism was announced; more geo-political 
religious turmoil as the world was becoming more modernized; more limitations placed upon 
freedom of expression and conformism as freedom and individualism have expanded etc. The 
paradox that the call for localism as occurring so loudly as the world was becoming ever 
economically integrated was identified by Rosenstock-Huessy in 1938, some thirty years before 
Lyotard, when he wrote: ‘Economy will be universal, mythology regional. Every step in the 
direction of the organizing the world’s economy will have to be bought off by a great number of 
tribal reactions’  (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1969, 718). Moreover as the following citation suggests he 
appreciated that this reaction was a healthy and necessary one.  
With a conscious economic organization of the whole earth, subconscious tribal 
organizations are needed to protect man’s mind from commercialization and 
disintegration. The more our shrinking globe demands technical and economic co-
operation, the more necessary it will prove to restore the balance by admitting the 
primitive archetypes of man’s nature also. (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1969, 715) 
  
If, then as I have suggested, global History is  necessary because peoples have become co-
temporal and co-spatial to an extent impossible to avoid, and regardless of the good or evil 
narratives of the West – that is regardless of the triumphalist or degeneration/ declinist Histories 
of the West – the powers that were originally unleashed by the West are now the powers 
commonly confronting us all.  In this tumult of the unification of the world  it is easy for the 
most important and simple and direct questions to be lost in the white noise of political and 
ideological speech. Nevertheless, one important and simple question, which we can ask, though 
we  may formulate it in slightly different ways,  is: are human beings enriched spiritually by 
what is happening? That is, is our life more spirited, more open to the riches and joys of life, and 
more resourceful and resilient in dealing with its trials and sorrows than it would be were we still 
living in pre-universal history? I might even put it more simply and more bluntly – is our life and 
the world we participate in more lovable, or, to use a word favoured by Ivan Illich (Illich, 1973; 
Cayley, 2005) which brings out the social dimensions of the lovable, more convivial? That we 
cannot give a categorical answer of yes to the question does not render the question meaningless, 
nor is it invalidated by the fact that it is the kind of question that many people, not to mention 
peoples, may have never considered asking. But once we consider that the question is laden with 
a depth of experience – the experience of the absence of convivial life, that is the experience of 
suffering inflicted by members of our own species, and the experience of thwarted  possibility 
we must also notice that it is a question that is asked within time. And just as our time is a time 
in which different peoples each with their own ‘bodies of memory’ and hence of time – times 
past and future hoped for – find themselves aware of and dependent upon each other – we are 
forced to ask after ‘our history’. And that now means  as much knowing each other’s history as 
our own – for now the other’s history is our history; thus now a river of works coming from 
other peoples, from/ on China, from/ on Islamic regions etc.  with their different venerations and 
appeals appears to satisfy the overwhelming fact of our common historicity. The conflicting 
appeals and venerations are all too easily dissolved into a relativist white noise by those who leap 
too swiftly from experience to metaphysics, and seek and then fail to find neat geometric-like   
normative rules - and the absolutists who do find such rules are not a whit less useless. But the 
contrariety of appeals  and venerations does not change the commonality of circumstance, even 
if phenomenologically we are confronted with different worlds within our one world. Thanks to 
Islamists we must be dead if we do not appreciate that  there are those who would far rather 
retreat into a former time in which what some groups hold sacred is protected rather than be open 
to the dissolution and insults, the sheer negation of the modern. Further, the geo-political, 
strategic accompaniments of this process play themselves out in all manner of ways – from, inter 
alia, the obvious attempts to protect and expand US hegemony via liberal (human rights talk) 
and military means, the various Middle Eastern hegemonic aspirants, or China’s economic 
colonial steps in Africa.    We live on a precipice of dangers of the most violent collisions, and 
hopeful prospects which can never be realized simply by acts of will and calls to political actions 
of social solidarity (which is why it seems to me Badiou, Agamben, and Žižek today hold such 
appeal to those who increasingly call for genuinely political/social alliances, though they must 
invariably over-simplify the inherently conflictual bodies of time constituting the present to 
achieve their desired solidarity).  
In so far as the religious is bound up with the recognition of the finitude of human powers 
and the recognition of powers beyond our own will, as well as the recognition that our survival 
and triumphs depend upon the unprecedented and incalculable, our unity today is every bit one 
of mere hope as it ever could have been. There are, of course, those who hold out the promise of 
our deliverance. But just as the deliverance that has been promised economically and infused 
Western institutions in the last fifty years has made many of our lives far less convivial (and let 
us not  be duped into thinking that economic growth in the ‘undeveloped world’ has in any way 
benefitted from the managerial revolution which has completely transformed and corrupted 
public and private corporations) – as had been predicted in such works of the 1950s and 60s such 
as The Organizational Man (Whyte, 1956), One Dimensional Man (Marcuse, 1964) or The 
Technological Society (Ellul, 1967) – we must concede that our hopes are either foolhardy and 
idolatrous, in  that we believe that the entire world  could be managed/ steered by various 
organizations, laws, committees et. al., or that we remain, irrespective of the specificity of our 
faith,  within a religious horizon, even if that horizon is what it is for so-called non-believers 
today  and what Franz Rosenzweig had defined as the last ‘Age of Christianity.’ That is the  Age 
that Franz Rosenzweig (following Schelling)  saw as having Goethe as its first priest, in which 
all denominational indicators of Christianity be dissolved into hope in a future in which human 
capacities and freedom and providence meet (Rosenzweig, 2005, 293-306) on the plane in which 
we are nevertheless required to ‘love our neighbour.’  
 Like his teacher, Rosenstock-Huessy, Franz Rosenzweig had held that Western 
civilization simply could not be understood without knowledge of the institutional 
transformation provided by Christianity. Rosenzweig almost became a Christian, but after 
deliberation and an epiphany at a Yom Kippur service on the eve of his baptism, he decisively 
defined himself as a Jew in antithesis to the post-Nietzschean socio-cultural Christian  
commitment that his cousins, Hans and Rudi Ehrenberg, and Rosenstock-Huessy, all Jewish 
apostates and Christian converts, had adopted. In The Star of Redemption, in a work written in 
the white heat of the Great War and Germany’s defeat, which had as one of its briefs an appeal to 
non-Jewish Germans to recognize the value and depth of their dependency as a Christianized  
people (of the Johannine Age) upon Judaism, Rosenzweig’s argued that Christianity is the 
universalizer of an originally Jewish insight. This was the insight that God(s), human beings and 
the world were not simply discrete poles at the basis of our experience with their disparate 
sources of authority and appeal, but  they potentially formed, as the Jewish people originally 
saw, a triadic union in which God’s love of the world and humans was as reciprocal as the love 
craved by (Jewish) humans from their  God and the world. Likewise, the recognition that this 
triadic union pointed to a loving source of creation who also revealed the secret that love was as 
strong as death (Song of Songs) and that we are redeemed if we respond to the commandment to  
love God and each other. What was originally a uniquely Jewish orientation to the cosmos, 
Christians would later appropriate, and as far as Rosenzweig could see no other peoples took up 
this insight – thus much of The Star considers Islam and he comes to the conclusion that Islam 
reverses the truths of revelation at every step of the way, and that such a  reversal involves the 
returning to the original differentiations between God, humans and world that is common to non-
Jewish, non-Christian, i.e. pagan peoples. What Rosenzweig suggests, and what Rosenstock-
Huessy demonstrates in far greater detail is that Christianity was a force for transforming the 
world, not just as Badiou (2003) suggests because of its solidarity. Though this is part of it, 
because the scale of solidarity it launched had been so successful – though, of course, Islam too 
is a universalist attempt at solidarity, and one, as we now see, which stands in striking geo-
political contrast and political ends to the (post)Christian - and this is not only true of Salafist 
Islam, but equally as true of most branches of Islam, whether Shia or Sunni, active in the Middle 
East and Central Asia. But every bit as importantly, Christianity took up forms of life that had 
previously entered into dead ends – including such forms as philosophy (consider Lucian’s 
depiction of the dire state of philosophy in the 2nd century) – and reconstituted them by placing 
them under the commandment of love. Even pagan alternatives to Christianity such as Plotinus’ 
neo-Platonism bears traces  of the importance of that move. Rosenstock, further makes the 
important point that Christianity took the archaic forms of social existence, tribes and empires, as 
well as the legacies of Greeks and Jews and created a new fusion of life. And like his 
predecessor, Frederick Ozanam (see Ozanam1867), and near contemporary Christopher Dawson 
(see Dawson 1991) (to take but two) he tracked the institutional  legacy of the Church, from its 
genesis through to the ostensibly anti-Christian, yet messianic fraternal revolutions, in France 
and Russia. Indeed the most remarkable thesis, which he defends in two books  of around 700 
pages each (Rosenstock-Huessy,1969, 1987) that the West has been formed by a sequence of 
total revolutions, each building upon and responding to the social conditions and evolving 
institutions and legacies (of what comes out of revolution). Arguing that European History is 
meaningless  unless we factor in that its central achievement in the first millennium is the 
Church, which in the second millennium is central for providing the social mosaic which in turn 
fosters the revolutionary impulse that runs through and galvanizes not only Europe but the globe, 
he plots out the sequence of revolutions and their legacies stretching from what he takes as  the 
first total revolution – the Papal revolution through to the Renaissance (the Italian revolution), 
the Reformation (the German Revolution), the English Revolution, the French Revolution and 
the Russian Revolution.  Until the French Revolution all prior revolutions were grounded in the 
language and substance of Christian appeals. And this is also true of the American revolution 
which along with other revolutions as in Spain and Austria, which he classifies as  a half-
revolution because they do not of themselves innovate something so totally new that their 
legacies have completely shaped out common institutionally heritage. If one considers the legacy 
of the nation state (the French Revolution) or private property (the English Revolution), the 
argument is a very plausible one.  
Rosenstock-Huessy was not interested in something so trivial and ridiculous as establishing the 
moral superiority of the West, but he did detect that a particular attitude towards time, and 
experience which is of the essence of what I am arguing is the real value of History, and that 
essence was original bound up in religious experience. Furthermore, such a view of time and 
experience renders History something fundamentally different to what ancient dynastic 
chronicles did, even when there was a moral or normative purpose as in China to the chronicling. 
It was also different to what Greek historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides did – and 
allowing for Thucydides’ realism he too has an instructional or moral purpose, even if his moral 
fiber is of far sterner and hard stuff than  we more squeamish moderns possess. For it is the 
notion of the end time, and the messianic, as started to be appreciated again by social theorists 
thanks to Derrida and Agamben, and, of course, by a figure who inspired both of them, 
Rosenzweig’s admirer and acquaintance, Walter Benjamin, that is unique to the Jewish 
polyphonous chronicle of the relationship between a creator God and His people that extends, in 
the writing period alone, to some fifteen hundred years. And this stands in the closest 
relationship to something that both serves as a corrective to the idolatry I mentioned above (the 
idolatry of technocracy, economism, and statism etc.) and as a means of orientation, so palpably 
ubiquitous in our Western/ Johannine age, but whose original presence and significance remains 
veiled thus blunting its meaning as  a resource now.  I am speaking of the very power we 
exercise to judge what is worthy of continuing and what is not, what is redeemable and what is 
too evil to continue – this eschatological aspect of life within an institutional setting in which  
human improvement (I deliberately choose this vague term)  is at the heart of social political 
action: from the refusal to accept slavery, the caste system, through to our present preoccupations 
with sexual discrimination. This idea of progress, which is neither instrumental nor 
straightforwardly sequential, that is progress of a sort commensurate with Benjamin’s bleak but 
robustly honestly uncompromising attention to social suffering, is the social inheritance of a 
particular  religious heritage  which has flown into the institutions of  a people, most of whom 
have forgotten the source of the original founding and flow. Saying this is not so much due to 
any  desire on my part to plead for a return to the original semantic field or life-way which made 
these possible, but far more importantly to see where we stand in relationship to the past so that 
we Westerners  are more conscious of who and what we are, more conscious of our 
‘autobiography, so that the social amnesia which plagues our contemporary condition be abated. 
And without a recognition that even our secularism is but the outgrowth of religious historical 
struggles we will be less likely to inspect our own classifiers of experience, our own semantic 
field. Not surprisingly, the corollary of our social amnesia and the failure to find the enchanted 
and awesome within our own heritage is a mish-mash of infantilism (Walt Disney is fine for 
infants) and Romanticism – which is not to deny that enchantment and powers of the spirit exist 
wherever human beings have struggled and survived over time. But the critical powers of 
Enlightenment were from their inception accompanied by a hankering for spirited life elsewhere, 
as its glare had withered so much of the sacred modes of experience within its own heritage. 
What had undoubtedly been a crisis brought about by the depth of clerical corruption within the 
Church in France, the price paid for its elevated association with the crown and the violent and 
uncompromising response to its Protestants became universalized and essentialized into the 
‘scientific’ fairy-tales of Voltaire, Diderot, D’Holbach et. al.  in which priests had ever plotted to 
dupe their idiot subjects into believing their malevolently designed superstitious fairy tales about 
reality. That the pathologies of Christendom, combined with multiple territorial and (especially 
France’s) hegemonic aspirations, had  plunged Europe into the Thirty Years War, and that that 
very war would spawn a new type of thinker no longer capable of finding anything sacred or 
venerable in the Christian narratives and competing interpretations of the meaning of that faith 
and its names is amply evident in Descartes’ own relationship to that event. But it is equally the 
case that the new faith in man and nations would find itself being played out in the century of 
wars whose penumbra we still inhabit. Again, we recall that the thinkers of the Enlightenment 
would begin by a historical severance in which the imagination would be curbed by the 
understanding, which was itself to be governed by the sequence, i.e. laws of nature. Descartes 
would turn his back on History altogether finding it but the tale of errors and folly, Spinoza 
would find it useful to for the dissolving of the biblical heritage so that we could pick out the 
moral lessons that had been revealed through revelation, but which philosophers like himself 
could now recount in argumentative terms. Of course, this would spawn reactions, and Vico 
having commenced a Cartesian realized that humanity shorn of its historicity was really nothing.  
History would be placed back in the mix and stage theory and tales of Historical progress be the 
corollary of Enlightenment – a ‘regulative Idea’ Kant would say, only to be trumped, for all his 
anti-Enlightenment sentiments, by Hegel who claimed that the expansion of freedom was the 
Absolute Idea. Of course since Rousseau’s mourning of original innocence, the West’s scientific 
expansion has been  accompanied by narratives of spiritual loss and decline. It is true that our 
historicity combines great possibility and loss, and we live in the midst of  this conflict between 
leaping further into the future and longing for exotic nostalgic retreat. My argument about the 
theological dimension of History is, however, not made in order to cater to one or the other of 
these modes  of orientation. Rather it is to place us more consciously within a larger portion of 
lived humanity, a greater body of time than that which simply began with Descartes or the 
French Revolution. But I do wish to raise in the final section of this paper one other pressing 
issue of our time, which may be better appraised by consideration of our religious roots. 
   A great temptation today for those wishing to seal peacefully the unity of humanity is to 
call for some overarching political organization, thus the world would be an empire. Here, we 
have much to learn, from the Jewish/ Christian experience and narrative which offers an 
alternative that also alerts us to the fundamental flaw within empire as such. It is in the Book of 
Daniel that this is powerfully articulated. I cite it at length.  
This is the dream. Now we will tell the interpretation of it before the king. You, O 
king, are a king of kings. For the God of heaven has given you a kingdom, power, 
strength, and glory;  and wherever the children of men dwell, or the beasts of the 
field and the birds of the heaven, He has given them into your hand, and has made 
you ruler over them all—you are this head of gold.  But after you shall arise 
another kingdom inferior to yours; then another, a third kingdom of bronze, which 
shall rule over all the earth.  And the fourth kingdom shall be as strong as iron, 
inasmuch as iron breaks in pieces and shatters everything; and like iron that 
crushes, that kingdom will break in pieces and crush all the others.  Whereas you 
saw the feet and toes, partly of potter’s clay and partly of iron, the kingdom shall 
be divided; yet the strength of the iron shall be in it, just as you saw the iron 
mixed with ceramic clay.  And as the toes of the feet were partly of iron and 
partly of clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong and partly fragile. As you saw 
iron mixed with ceramic clay, they will mingle with the seed of men; but they will 
not adhere to one another, just as iron does not mix with clay.  And in the days of 
these kings the God of heaven will set up a kingdom which shall never be 
destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people; it shall break in 
pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand forever. (Daniel 2:36-44 
New King James Version) 
It would not be overstating the case to argue that Rosenstock-Huessy’s corpus is one great 
historical exegesis and apology for the task laid out in this passage of Daniel. In the Second 
volume of his Sociology he explores how this idea of the eternal kingdom (Rosenstock-Huessy, 
2008/2009, Vol. 2, 169-179)  would be at the centre of the Medieval idea of the Church and 
would be formulated as the translatio imperii. The translatio imperii was based on the insight 
that a new form of life (the Church) had been found that did not obey the cyclical rhythms of 
empires past and future empires, and thus the logic of the birth and extinction of empires need 
not be repeated. The argument had been mounted in the context of his greater analysis of the 
birth and deaths of tribes, of empires spawning the Jewish nation and the evolution of the Greek 
city states, and his argument that Christianity had occurred at the interface of these four ancient 
life-ways. In far more sociological and anthropological depth, and applying a far more elaborate 
account of classical, imperial, religious and Church history than is found say in Badiou, or Žižek 
(who both also draw attention to the uniqueness of the significance of Christianity in history), he 
argues that Christianity occurrence meant reconstituting the potentialities of each form of life on 
a new horizon. Further, he argues that in so as elemental social forms are built on  the 
fundamental drive of human existence to conquer death by finding forms of life lovable enough 
to surmount extinction, Christianity’s discovery of death as the condition of the life, and the 
spread of a teaching in which the victim came to the banquet of life to speak on behalf of all 
victims of suffering (anticipating Girard) so that even the highest (the God of the living and the 
dead himself) becomes the willing sacrifice to overcome suffering and death (see esp. 
Rosenstock-Huessy, 1978, esp. 55-57; Rosenstock-Huessy 1946)  
 Whereas ancient empires saw themselves as self-sufficient  the dream of the Holy Roman 
Empire was the dream of translatio imperii ‘forms all empires into one empire.’ (Rosenstock-
Huessy, Ibid., 462.) The Church had undertaken to unify all the empires by abandoning the  
spatial organizing imperial principle by means of which empires aspired to reconcile heaven and 
earth, and replacing it with a principle of movement through the ages. Christianity, as another 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s titles has put it, had introduced The Multiformity of Man, while it had 
provided a common spiritual orientation which could bring concord into the diverse multi-
formities - that was why even at its most profane the Church was never merely the terrestrial 
empire or state. The Church could, likewise, abide the differences of empire by uniting them 
spiritually within an oecumene, no longer conceived, as it was originally, in the known Greco-
Roman  as simply the inhabited world, but a world in spiritual concordance. Thus, according to 
Rosenstock-Huessy, the eternal abyss between the aspiration of empire and its thwarted 
fulfillment is overcome as the Church transposes the necessity of reconciliation between heaven 
and earth  into a spiritual reconciliation which seeks to unify all the empires across the times in 
so far as they themselves contribute to the greater body of times and potencies of the future. This 
mission and triumph, according to Rosenstock-Huessy,  is visible in the great act of coronation 
of Charles the Great, as Holy Roman Emperor – Charles himself was caught unawares and he 
saw no need to be united with previous empires, just as his troops wanted nothing to do with 
either ancient Romans or their modern  counterparts. And it is also true that Charles’s empire 
was neither, as Napoleon famously quipped, Holy nor Roman nor even imperial (at least in the 
traditional sense), but says Rosenstock-Huessy ‘Charles entered into universal history through 
defending the faith of the Church, through the  requirement of embodying the Christian era, thus 
through entering the portal into eternity (Rosenstock-Huessy, Ibid. 175).’ He had been 
incorporated into the Church’s universal time body. And if the act of incorporation would not 
surprise for Christendom to remain undivided and fragmented, it nevertheless would provide a 
raft for peoples across times in which the love, faith and hope in universal unity was long 
sustained.  
It is, then, for Rosenstock-Huessy, the creation of a universal history, not merely as an idea, but 
as a lived body that is behind Rosenstock-Huessy’s vision of the Christian faith – a faith that is 
not so much a private decision, but a social force of transformation and unification. I have 
suggested above that Rosenzweig’s idea of the Johannine Age retains its relevance precisely 
because neither the Petrine Church (which had been the basis of the translatio imperii) nor the 
Pauline Church any longer have the universal capacity to actualize the hope that is still widely 
shared by many (post)Christianized peoples of the West.   
 It is a widely shared, if not uncontested, sentiment in the West that the contemporary 
contiguity of disparate and inimical traditions within the world, as difficult and sometimes 
dangerous as it is, is an opportunity. Further, to simply dissolve traditions into the anodyne 
vacuum of spiritlessness of the Modern West neither enriches us or the Other. Rosenstock-
Huessy had provided a name for a society of creative tension in which our most fundamental 
differences be retained but we find a way to mutually participate within this one world - the 
metanomic society. While, the idea is nothing new, his definition of the metanomic is  a neat 
reminder of how Theology, History and contemporary circumstance and need neatly match-up: 
‘Metanomics ..might be interpreted as the omnipresence of God in the most contradictory 
patterns of human society’, adding a paragraph later:  
The equilibrium between the special social sciences in which man 
appears to differ, and the social philosophy which makes him appear 
eternally the same human being, is the secret of all research in the social 
field. We cannot give up one side of the social paradox, either by 
identifying all men as being the same, or by allowing them to become so 
different that they lose their power of identifying themselves with others. 
Peace is the term which expresses the existence of this paradox in 
society: that different people by having peace together, are identifiable. 
(Rosenstock-Huessy, 1970: 42)  
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